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Abstract 
Post-work politics, with a focus on universal basic income,  rather  than  an  agenda  of  saving jobs and improving the quality of work, has been a growth area on the left. 
This article chal- lenges the views of proponents that their claims are ‘on trend’ with developments in markets  and technology. It does so by examining  two  supposed  
‘tipping  points’  concerning  crises  in the production of value in capitalism and in the availability of  and  attachment  to  work.  Through a rigorous examination of available 
evidence, the article demonstrates that the sto-     ries contained in post-work discourses about business models,  technologies,  labour  markets and workers are not 
empirically sustainable. Suggestions are then made about what more credible accounts of actually existing  capital,  technology  and  labour  might  look  like,  and  what the 
direction of alternative, progressive policy agendas might be. 
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Introduction 
Post-work politics, as pursued on the left, draws on a variety of normative and empirical claims. For the purposes of this article the former (the 
preferred outcome) are set aside in order to focus on the latter (the outcomes predicted)  In political debate, empirical evidence, underpinned 
by guiding concepts is righlt seen as a precondition of plausibility. Paradigm shift perspectives – of which post-work politics is a variant – 
require evidence that their claims are ‘on trend’ with developments in markets and technology and this is exactly what we observe in claims 
made by leading proponents such as Paul Mason and Srnicek and Williams.  
Such claims are associated with overlapping perspectives. Some come from a specifically post-work politics that relies primarily on assertions 
concerned with the effects of automation. Optimism on the prospects for the latter is fuelled by the view that ‘machines can increasingly 
produce all necessary foods and services’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015: 113). Others can be located in the discourse of post-capitalism; whose 
object is value and profits at a macro and micro economic level. In both instances, the transformative powers of science and technology are 
the primary perceived driver. However, there is another link. It is the contention of this article that they are held together by the idea that the 
worlds of business and work have reached a tipping point or points. Various structural obstacles mean that capitalism can no longer supply the 
profitable business models or the jobs that can raise productivity, find profitable new markets or sustain a viable economic and political order. 
A paradigm shift towards something variously described as full luxury communism, a post-work society or a collaborative, network economy is 
not only desirable, but inexorable. The centrality of the demand for a universal basic income (UBI) is the logical outcome of tipping point 
perspectives, summed up in a much-lauded graffiti sprayed on a wall by the far-left wing of the gilet jaunes, ‘we want some money now while 
we are waiting for communism’.  
In articulating a case for a ‘world without work’, it needs asking. which world are we talking about? Such discourses are heavily skewed 
towards the advanced capitalist economies and are either uninterested in or blissfully unaware of job growth or widespread informal work, or 
technological capacities and economic conditions n the Global South. However, given the absence of serious coverage of this kind, our focus 
has to ber on the claims that post-work thinkers actually do make.  
The problem with twin tipping point arguments is that they are not true and therefore lead the left in some misleading and mistaken policy 
directions. By not true I mean the stories they are telling about business models, technologies, labour markets and workers are not, by and 
large, empirically sustainable. The article sets out the dimensions and sources of tipping point claims and critically interrogate them, before 
suggesting what more credible and empirically-grounded stories about actually existing capital, technology and labour might look like, and 
what the direction of alternative, progressive policy agendas might be.  
Tipping point 1: post-capitalism? 
Where do ideas about post-capitalism come from? The main derivation is from schools of ‘autonomist’ or ‘post workerist’ Marxism linked with 
the well-known ideas of Hardt and Negri and less prominent theorists of cognitive capitalism (See Thompson and Smith 2017). In such 
frameworks knowledge value in a third stage of capitalism (or post-capitalism) increasingly displaces value created through labour in 
production. Such value is created through the ‘general intellect’ at work and in social life more generally. The general intellect is taken from 
Marx’s ‘The Fragment on Machines’, a short set of speculative notes about a possible future that was part of the Grundrisse. In this 
hypothetical future, scientific knowledge will become the source of wealth, reversing the subordination of labour facilitated by capital’s 
previous appropriation of science and technology and providing the basis for the end of scarcity and the transition to (full luxury) communism. 
Inside the workplace, autonomous labour cannot be commanded or measured, whilst externally knowledge value and information starts to 
corrode the price mechanism, especially in the digital, internet sectors which become the leading edge of the new economy. As the old 
economy shrivels, a new form arises: the spontaneous rise of collaborative production of goods and services that no longer no respond to the 
discipline of the market and managerial hierarchy’ (Mason, 2015) 
The second source is from knowledge economy and informational capitalism theories in both social science and popular business literatures. In 
essence, we find the same claims about knowledge value, shorn of the Marxist language, as well as the same hype about the rise of horizontal 
networks. Dews (2015) argues that  when the cost of producing goods and services shrinks to near zero the entire rationale of capitalism 
becomes meaningless . The disruptive capacities of technological innovation (notably AI, big data analytics) is held to be the ultimate driver, 
facilitating an integrated network of smart products and markets. Hybrid companies in the sharing economy such as Uber and AirB&B are 
bridgeheads or precursors to a fully collaborative commons. Most of Dew arguments are taken from Rifkin’s (2015) Age of Access, one of the 
latest in a stream of speculative fictions that move on to the next paradigm break before the audience has worked out that the last one hadn’t 
happened. Rifkin (and similar business writers) have also been a key source for Mason and for Hardt and Negri. Assertions that the internet is 
‘inherently designed’ to be open and a  universally accessible distributed network also remind us of a parallel technologically determinist 




There is some recognition amongst post-capitalist commentators that there are come obstacles to at least a more rapid tipping point. These 
include the creation of monopolies to restrict access, extract rent (as profit substitute)  and maintain scarcity. However, these measures 
treated largely as residues of the old and the last throw of dinosaur corporations, swimming against the current. Wrong – they are (part of) the 
current.  
To understand actually existing capital, it makes sense to look at the largest firms and their revenues. Of the top 50 companies globally by 
revenue – which seems a reasonable place to start given claims about profitability - sixteen are financial corporations, nine energy or 
extractive, seven auto six retail and the rest a mixture of health, electronics, telecoms, construction, Pharma, conglomerates and electronics. 
Only four of these firms had declining revenue in the latest year. And only two tech giant – Apple and Amazon – appear in the list (Fortune 
2018), though the picture would look a little different if the criteria was market capitalization. It is simply untrue that the kind of sectors and 
(implied) business models used in post-capitalist projections dominate the global economy. The archetypal companies of this era of capitalism 
are just, if not more, likely to be Shell, Walmart, RB Hathaway, Toyota, Samsung, Axa and Glencore. This is not to dismiss the three A’s (Apple, 
Amazon, Alphabet). Firms can be archetypal in different ways, for example for their growth strategies, their employment models and their 
supply chains. It is a question of proportion and plausibility.  
Such data does not explicitly reveal how such firms make their money. There are clearly a variety of business models in play. It is important to 
resist the hype that the digital somehow defines the economy, as in terminology such as platform capitalism. ‘Platform’ suffers from classic 
conceptual and empirical over-stretch. Its emphasis on the software bringing together producers and consumers conflates quite different 
business models (Uber’s contracts/algorithmic controls, Facebook with its targeted advertising based on the extraction of user data), and 
obscures ownership and hierarchical power relations. (Weatherby 2018) 
Given the variety of business models within and beyond the digital sector, it is important to chart some of the central trends. Research from 
radical political economy scholars (see Newsome et al 2016) in recent decades shows that the global economy is organised primarily through 
complex value and commodity chains. Chains can be thought of complex networks of buyers, suppliers and intermediaries. with various 
‘nodes’. Production of goods and services is often fragmented as larger players use outsourcing and other measures to reduce direct 
involvement in production. decrease input costs and focus on the most profitable activities. Contrary to the image of collaborative, horizontal 
relations, they are characterised by concentration of capital and centralisation of power. The key role in both buyer and producer- driven 
chains is played by oligopolistic lead firms. Concentration and centralisation of capital, notably through merger and acquisition, facilitates high 
market capitalization and securing of strategic asset that strengthens brand power. Fragmented production networks increase competition 
between rivals, allowing lead firms to capture value within the chain from suppliers and workers. Look in detail at any of the business models 
of some of the above firms such as Walmart, Apple and Glencore and this is what you will find.  
With respect to concentration, the profit share of tope 200 largest US corporations doubled between 1950 and mid-2000s (Foster and 
McChesney 2012). A recent report for the Resolution Foundation found that the proportion of revenue accounted for by the largest 100 UK 
firms (23%) had risen by a quarter since2003-4 and concentration has increased in two thirds of industries. Uncomfortably for post-capitalist 
perspectives this is equally, if not more the case in the internet sector. Media and entertainment industry concentration is a long-term trend 
and the online giants have continued it. For example the acquisition of Instagram by Facebook has created a unique fusion of economic, 
political and social power. As numerous net critics, often former insiders, have noted web quasi-monopolies, ironically, utilise then monetise 
users’ social networks within enclosed eco-systems. Commons-based peer production initiatives such as Wikipedia are, unfortunately, not 
remotely typical of the sector let alone the capitalist economy. More broadly, it has become obvious to all but the most dedicated boosters 
that the sharing economy, with its narrative of social reciprocity and neutral bridge-building between users and providers of services is a 
fiction. Companies such as Uber have built a business model that requires workers to be treated as independent contractors subject to 
algorithmic control. Along with others, such as AirB&B, they leverage their status as intermediary platforms and access to data to enter, build 
market power.  
None of this is meant to argue that such business models are stable or guarantees of profitability, merely that in many cases they persist and 
prosper. Alongside concentration and centralization, finalization is the other and arguably most significant trend underpinning contemporary 
business models. In this context, financialization refers to the growing influence of capital markets on the behaviour of non-financial 
corporations (and state actors). The pursuit of shareholder value becomes the primary object, displacing older retain and invest models. If we 
return to the global value chain territory, pressure to meet targets for return on capital employed and increase income streams for 
shareholders explains much of the slicing up of the chain through offshoring and sub-contracting. Firms are increasingly treated as bundles of 
disposable assets from which value can be leveraged. Corporate governance and strategy become increasingly focused on delivering stock 
market expectations, set through valuation models and metrics used by institutional investors (see Cushen and Thompson 2016). Perpetual 
restructuring, financial engineering, enhanced focus on dividends to shareholders and, in the case of private equity, servicing debt. Though 
there are new forms of value extraction, again contrary to post-capitalist arguments about value in production, much of the cost recovery is 
through labour and the labour process in terms of headcount reduction, performance targets and work intensification, as well as value 
transfers impacting on worker wages, pensions and benefits. 
Even if we focus on the micro economy rather than the conditions that led to the GFC in 2008, financialization is a far better explanation for 
the crises and contradictions of contemporary capitalism than automation or zero-cost production. For example, if it was the former, we would 
see evidence for far greater investment in physical and human capital and in innovation. Instead, we have deep-seated productivity problems, 
at least in the most neoliberal regimes where financialization flourishes relatively unchecked  (Cashman 2017). Total business investment 
represents a smaller proportion of GDP than previous decades.  Firms are not short of money, but liquid assets and balance sheet capital have 
been used to pay dividends and engage in share buy-backs to keep market value high. 
Digital and other advanced technologies are better understood for their role in coordinating inter and intra-firm activities and in managing 
work and workers. On-demand business models such as those in the logistics sector require companies such as DHL to use software to track 
the flow of goods and labour required across their outsourced services supplied to various clients. The same processes can be used to track the 
performance of employees. This is repeated in different form in other sectors. Amazon are notorious for its intensive monitoring and 
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treatment of warehouse workers, but the practices are wider, yet the driver of the technological subordination of labour may also be indirect. 
When Amazon took over Whole Foods it imposed an inventory management system ostensibly aimed at cutting down waste. Yet recent 
reports (Smith 2018) indicate a massive ramping up of work intensity through data input, scorecards and job cuts. Workforce management 
software – WFM – that focuses on scheduling work and monitoring time, attendance and performance can have similar effects for on-demand 
labour in sectors such as care, retail and security. What some call the quantified workplace is not necessarily typical of all sectors, tending to 
proliferate in those that operate on low margins and those where monitoring can be exercised through crowdsourcing platforms. However, 
with the spread of people analytics and other types of digital Taylorism, we can confidently say that science and technology have not reached a 
point where they are no longer appropriated by capital for its own ends.  
Tipping Point 2: Post-work? 
In this sphere, the tipping point claims consist of overlapping crises of access and attachment to jobs. In a nutshell, most people hate their 
jobs, which is fortuitous because most of then are going to disappear due to automation.  Exit from work is good for everybody as.t ‘that job is 
necessary either for your well being or for the well-being of others’ (Danaher 2018) . In their influential accelerationist text, Srnicek and 
Williams (2015) claim that a rising ‘surplus population’ is emerging on the back of a technologically triggered crisis of work.  
Before we unpack these claims, let’s start with some potential common ground. There is a lot to dislike in contemporary work trends (for an 
overview, see Findlay and Thompson 2017).  Many people work too much, either because of long hours, or excessive demands. Though we 
have historically high levels of employment, too many of those jobs are low quality, under-rewarded, insecure, stressful and over-managed. 
Though this varies hugely across firms and occupations, there is a growing gap between what work – as specified by many employers – wants 
of us and we want from work. Unsurprisingly, even corporate surveys show low levels of employee engagement and increased cynicism.  
The leap from these observations to  ‘widespread hatred for jobs (Srnicek and Williams) may seem logical but that would be a mistake. We 
have not reached a work identity tipping point. It’s not obvious where such claims derive from – certainly not from academic studies. The same 
survey and case studies evidence summarised above also shows high levels of work attachment and identity. The reports of disengagement 
refer to the firm and its broken promises and poor practices rather than the work itself. There is, of course, the much-touted YouGov survey on 
the back of Graeber’s (2018)  ‘bullshit jobs’ argument. Despite a loaded question (‘does your job make a meaningful contribution to the world? 
), the result was still  63% saying it did  (see Thompson and Pitts 2018 for a full account). Sources of work attachment are varied, ranging from 
the intrinsic to the instrumental, but they are real and persistent and cannot be written off as the externally imposed effects of an outdated 
work ethic. Nor is it the case that strong attachments are confined to or correlated with higher paid or skilled jobs. For example, low paid care 
workers report strong intrinsic satisfaction alongside low pay and difficult conditions. (Hebson et al 2015) 
Conversely, professional workers can and do enjoy the positive features of their circumstances, whilst kicking back against threats to their 
autonomy, work-life balance or pensions. The complexity and contradictory nature of work treatment and attachment was illustrated in a 
recent BBC news report on an A&E department under increasing pressure. A senior burse interviewed said that she loved and gated her job on 
the same day.  
In principle, post-work tipping point perspectives don’t need workers to hate their hobs if they are going to disappear anyway’ Admittedly, this 
core claim sits somewhat uneasily with current record levels of employment. However, the claims rest on future projections associated with 
the threat of automation appears to be be stronger. After all, it is true that robots and AI (such as machine learning) could replace some 
routine tasks. A strong version of this claim, propagated in a clutch of futurist texts from academics and consultants, , functions as the 
empirical heart of tipping point arguments.  
Of these texts, the claim made by two engineering science academics,  Frey and Osborne (2013) that 47% of US jobs were ‘vulnerable’ to 
automation has had the greatest impact. The language is of vulnerability, susceptibility and risk, yet in the process of endless repetition and 
circulation might has largely become will happen.   Robotics and machine learning linked to big data analytics will reach beyond the routine to 
the cognitive.  The higher the potential figure, the more it tends to be embraced on the normative, aspirational shores of post-work punditry, 
for whom, as noted earlier, almost all jobs could and should be automated.  
The limits of automation 
Let’s stick closer to the claims and examine the ‘methodology’ of Frey and Osborne (see Wajcman 2016 for a wider discussion of the ‘clutch’ of 
futurists). They say that automatability of the job is a function of the skills required to complete the task. They then subject a sub-set of a 
daataset of occupations to this test to come up with the susceptibility figure. There are twp fundamental problems of conditionality and 
context with this approach, which is broadly typical of the genre. First, job, tasks and occupation are confused and conflated. This matters. 
‘Jobs’ are an amalgam of particular divisions of labour and employment/contractual relations. Tasks can be removed or configured through the 
design and application of technologies without eliminating the job, let alone complex and heterogeneous construction ‘occupation’.  Talk of 
automatability outside of the context of actual labour processes and employer uses of labpur power(skills, dispositions, emotions, formal and 
tacit knwoledges and so on)  is misleading. In particular, it  and cannot be addressed through algorithms that search occupational databases 
for routineess or similar categories. Many high products can be made with relatively low tech methods.   
The second overlapping problem is that a focus on bundles of skills is the absence of any consideration of the political economy of automation, 
particularly though the business models of firms. Like any other fundamental decision about the technical division of labour, the introduction 
of robotics or AI will be driven primarily their value proposition and cost considerations. There will be circumstances in which those 
considerations will lead to the elimination of jobs or roles, especially in the case of information handling and machine learning. In many others, 
the fact that something can be automated does not mean it will be. Many expanding sectors (hospitality, warehousing, platform workjng) 
operate low margin business models that rest on the flexible and intensive utilisation of labour. Introducing robots would be expensive and 
largely irrelevant. Also, as argued earlier, technology is already perfoming a crucial role in coordination and direction of the labour and intra-
firm processes .  
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Then there is the issue of dominant business models at a higher, aggregate level . Financialization is the dominant trend in accumulation 
regimes. At the strategic and operational level, as the research of economists such as Marianna Mazzucato has shown, corporate decisions are 
disposed towards asset utilization (including labour) and enhancing income streams for shareholders against investment in physical and 
human capital and therefore innovation.  This tallies with the widely observed point that substantial new technological inputs is inconsistent 
with the weak or stagnant productivity growth figures for the past decade. These problems underpin much of the critical commentary made by 
a range of bodies from bodies as diverse as the OECD, Scottish Government, Resolution Foundation. Economic Policy Institute and Roosevelt 
Institute.  
As a comprehensive report for the Roosevelt Institute (2018, p. 16)  put it, ‘While it is challenging to know what the future holds, the data are 
clear. We are not in the middle of a labor displacing technological boom, nor are we on the verge of rapid technological change in the near 
future’. Aside from productivity figures, they point to data from the Bureau of Labour Statistics that shows very little employment churn, which 
would be expected if automation was displacing workers.  Eighty five case studies by Willocks and Lacity (2018) found that AI was ‘notably 
absent’ from most organisations in the USA and Asia-Pacific. Such findings are confirmed in the authoritative OECD study (Gregory and Zierahn 
2016) that found an average of  9^ automatability across 21 countries. Crucially they rejected an occupational-based approach in favour of a 
task-based one.  
It is of course true that the complex macro and micro contingencies discussed above make projections of aggregate job loss due to automation 
problematic. However, if the future is difficult we also have the past. We have been here before. . In every previous wave of technological 
change, catastrophism has dominated public and policy discourse. The predilection of parts of the left to technological determinism and 
‘capitalism in final crisis’ scenarios makes them willing fellow travellers. Left commentators in the 1980s used and produced books with title 
such as the end of work and the jobless future to describe the effects of the microprocessor ‘revolution’. Studies of the labour process in that 
period rightly identified the loss of traditional skills due to application of such technologies, but did not adequately grasp the ways in which 
new ones would emerge as employers and employees negotiated the changing technical division of labour. Tasks were augmented, degraded 
and boundaries redrawn far more than whole jobs and occupations eliminated. As the American economist David Autor (2015) has observed, 
tasks that cannot be substituted by automation are generally complemented by it Furthermore, that doesn’t even consider the emergence of 
new jobs that are facilitated by new technologies or by the restless drive of capital to extend the scope of the commodity form into new social 
and spatial territories. From 1989 to 2017 there was a net gain of 118 million jobs in the US economy. Yet we are now back to extreme 
pessimism on job creation prospects.  
Job trends 
Though not perfect – for example some methods use pay as a proxy for skill level –  the most plausible way of assessing both the likely patterns 
of job creation and their vulnerability to automation is to look at current and projected job growth trends. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
produces far more detailed assessments than their UK counterparts. If we examine Table 1, the core trends are reasonably clear.  
 
 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
There is little sign of an economy dominated by the kind of knowledge and immaterial labour projected in cognitive capitalism perspectives. 
Job growth is in two main clusters. The dominant trend is the further growth of interactive and personal service roles. Paul Mason says that a 
future economy can’t generate enough new post-modern servants. Maybe, but it doesn’t have to. Sectors such as health, social care, cleaning  
and hospitality have been long term sources of growth, with surely unmet needs (such as aged and childcare provision)  still to come. The 
second, smaller grouping brings together higher-level IT and systems roles, general managers and some professional services such as 
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accountants. Again, these are long-term growth areas. tjough we could see some reconfiguring and re-badging around digitalization. These 
trends represent the widely-observed and continuing polarization in the occupational structure (e.g. Autor 2010), with a shrinkage in the 
proportion of skilled and mid-level jobs. The exceptions, in this table at least’ are construction, transport and maintenance. The other growth 
area, though poorer paid and more precarious has been in warehousing and logistics, typified by Amazon ‘Fulfilment Centres’.  The basic 
trends are consistent with evidence closer to home. In their commentary on automation and the UK labour market, the Resolution Foundation 
(Corlett 2016) charts rising employment shares for high and low-paid jobs ib the last 20 years, with a ‘hollowing out’ on the middle.  The largest 
percentage growth in Scotland has been in low skilled occupations. Including  caring, leisure and ‘other service’ occupations (Scottish 
Government 2018); while one in four new jobs in the recent period in Ireland has come from hospitality, with next larget sector being 
construction. (Taft 2018) 
They key point about job trends is that they reinforce scepticism about the medium-term impact of automation. The higher end cluster of IT 
and professional jobs are complex and knowledge-intensive. The larger, lower-end service jobs mostly rest on business models that extract 
value from forms of labour power drawing on a variety of ‘soft skills’ and tacit knwoledges where human interaction would be difficult or 
counterproductive to automate. Take waiters and waitresses, who have a 94% automatability rating in Frey and Osborne’s study. There may 
be areas of fast food where automation makes business sense, but for most restaurants, coffee shops and other hospitality contexts the social 
interaction with the customer is integral to the value proposition. ‘Routineness’ does not easily map on to such jobs. 
There are growth areas, notably truck driving and warehouse picking and packing, that are ultimately more susceptible to robots or AI. 
However, the key word is ultimately. We are decades away from large scale use of the much-hyped driverless vehicles on normal roads. As for 
picking and packing, robots are expensive and still lack the dexterity and mobility of human labour, which is part of the reason for the ansece 
so for of significant robotisation.   
Politics and policy 
The problem with UBI is that it is a solution to attachment and job destruction crises that do not exist, at least not in the forms claimed.  If UBI 
is a solution to another problem – for example, the coercive and commodified nature of wage labour under capitalism – okay, but good luck 
with trying to persuade the electorate with that one. Policy agendas need to be driven by the immediate to medium-term challenges arising 
from actually existing business models, labour processes and markets. Those challenges are varied and numerous. 
The real job or work crises are not expressed in single or simple ways, therefore no one size fits all policy prescription is appropriate. Take one 
example. There is a need for a more explicit politics of time. While it would be a good idea of most people worked less, a demand for 
something like a universal four-day week is too blunt an instrument. A sizeable minority of the workforce want to work more.  Office for 
National Statistics data reveals that 14.6% of UK workers are doing ‘involuntary’ part-time work. This is a huge problem that contributes to in-
work poverty. The figure has increased by more than 40% in the UK and USA since 2006. At the other end of the spectrum, one in ten workers 
are ‘over-employed’ and would like to work less, even if it meant a pay cut. Under-employment is clearly part of rising labour market 
insecurity, but again this comes in different forms.  A report for the  RSA (Wallace-Stephens,2018) estimates that at least one in seven 
employees experience  ‘chronically precarious’ practices. Importantly,  many are full-time employees and the insecurity is in in work (poor 
conditions and treatment) as well as access to it. In contrast, ‘acutely precarious’ workers, including those on zero-hour contracts or in multiple 
jobs are more likely to be on non-standard contracts.  
It is important to remember the earlier point that most work is not precarious and that most employees enjoy aspects of their work. A 
contemporary and comprehensive politics of work needs to focus on the things that they do not enjoy, notably stagnant wages, rising work 
intensity and declining autonomy associated with excessive demands, blurring of work-life boundaries and punitive performance regimes. In 
many occupations, growing work strain is the result. The problem, as I’ve argued elsewhere (Thompson and Pitts 2018) is bullshit in the job, 
rathe than bullshit jobs. 
The key point about the above changes is that none of them are the result of automation, though some (such as work intensity) are sometimes 
linked to employer uses of new technologies. Chronic and acute precariousness and excessive work demands are the result of choices by 
employers and governments.  Technological catastrophism obscures the agency involved in the making of these choices and the potential 
agency in unmaking therm. Technological determinism inhibits the latter as there only appears to be two choices, luddism or passivity as we 
wait for automation and UBI.  
One positive effect of the work futures debate is that it has created an opening for a renewed, but more realistic policy agenda around job 
quality. Any job is not better than none. For example, a recent study (Chandola 2017) found that unemployed people who found good quality 
jobs experienced big improvements in their mental health, whereas those who secured jobs characterised by two or more adverse quality 
measures had outcomes no different from those who remained unemployed. By more realistic I mean abandoning the illusion that all work 
can be upskilled and all displaced workers can be retrained for a high skill, digital role. That is simply inconsistent with the patterns of job 
growth. As Dallot (2018) argues, we have to learn to live with ‘low skilled work’. while making it more secure, better rewarded and with 
improved conditions. Many of these issues can be addressed through labour market regulation, as well as moves to make it easier for unions 
to organise and bargain. A progressive agenda would use the Government commitment (following the Taylor Review), to be accountable for 
the quality as well as the quantity of jobs, as leverage for much more ambitious programme that also learns from the Fair Work Commission in 
Scotland. .  
However, many practices that diminish job security and quality are rooted in low-cost, finance-driven business models. Again, post-work, post-
capitalist narratives, with their emphases on sharing, collaborative economies, knowledge value and zero-cost reproduction get in the way of 
realistic, progressive policy agendas. If concentration and financialization of capital are the main drivers of destructive business models. The 
logical direction are policies  aimed at deconcentration through greater competition, regulatory oversight and promotion of more diverse 
forms of ownership. With respect to financialization, measures need to incentivise long -term investment in human an physical capital 
(including more robots!), while inhibiting financial engineering distributive returns based on maximising shareholder value. This can include 
policies to change corporate governance and company law, the nature and frequency reporting mechanisms, de-link executive pay from share 
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options/prices, limit share-buy backs; as well as creating countervailing stakeholder power, including workers on boards (see Findlay et al 2018 
for more detail).   
Such policies are part of a wider agenda to  re-balance the economy away from a finance-led growth regime towards one that measures and 
promote GDP and national income in different ways and develop a green new deal that can also be an engine of high quality job creation. Re-
balancing also has a spatial dimension. Future job growth will happen, but will be uneven across regions, particularly for high skilled 
opportunities. Government – at various levels – needs to be much more interventionist in its incentives and investments, particularly as the 
effects of Brexit ripple through what is left of the UK’s manufacturing base.   
In conclusion, whether you want to change or replace capitalism, you need to understand the nature of the beast. Claims that we are at a post-
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